Why think that explanatory gaps between the mental and the physical have metaphysical import, of the sort that could falsify materialism (physicalism)? The best motivation stems from Chalmers’ 'two-dimensional argument against materialism’. Chalmers’ suggestion is that, first, there is an independently motivated reason to accept so-called 'epistemic two-dimensionalism' (E2D), a semantic framework which allows for a significant (and desirable) post-Kripke reforging of the link between meanings known a priori and genuine possibilities. Given E2D, given a conceiving-based epistemology of the meanings/intensions at issue in E2D, and given the conceivability of zombies, it follows that materialism fails. But as Biggs and I have argued, E2D is better implemented by means of an abduction-based epistemology of the meanings/intentions at issue – a route opened up by our work arguing that abduction is an a priori mode of inference. E2D implemented with an abductive epistemology of intensions doesn’t obviously support taking zombies to be genuinely possible, even granting that they are conceivable. On the contrary, the all-things-considered output of the relevant abductive deliberation seems to be on the side of materialism.

Requests for an advance copy of the paper, as well as the Zoom link, can be directed to Dr. Neil Manson (namanson@olemiss.edu).

More information about future UM Philosophy Forum events can be found on the department calendar at www.philosophy.olemiss.edu.